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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002342

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2012

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [TU](#)

SUBJECT: UN/CYPRUS: DEMARCHE TO TURKEY ON US-UK DRAFT
RESOLUTION FOR SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS ON APRIL 10

REF: A. SECSTATE 91728

[B](#). ANKARA 2155

(C) Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch. Reason: 1.5(b)(d)

[1](#)1. (C) D/Polcouns delivered ref A talking points April 10 to Necip Eguz, MFA DDG for Cyprus-Greece-Aegean affairs. Eguz noted that, as far as he knew (at 1700 local time) the UN was still negotiating the text and that no consensus had been reached. Moreover, he took issue with what he saw as the continuing effort to "point fingers at ("TRNC President") Denktas," and to make him wear the jacket for the failure of the talks.

April 9 with Eguz

[1](#)2. (C) In an April 9 meeting with DCM and D/Polcouns, Eguz noted several GOT concerns. First, the Russians, Chinese, and French were pushing changes to the resolution that would include in the revised text a reference to Resolution 1251 -- "essentially an UNFICYP-extending plan" -- and to "reduction of foreign troops" on Cyprus. "Why should that be in there?" he asked. "It will only make things worse." Eguz volunteered that USG is working to improve the draft resolution, emphasizing that any improvements should "keep the door open" to the Annan Plan and the UNSYG's good offices mission. Second, the "beauty contest" by which Denktas would be explicitly blamed in the draft for the failure of the talks was "absolutely unacceptable, unnecessary, and without merit." Eguz reiterated that, in the meantime, the MFA had worked with Denktas to come up with potential confidence-building measures, including above all granting Greek Cypriots direct access to and trade rights in northern Cyprus.

[1](#)3. (C) DCM emphasized that: (1) the UN/EU process had been key to maintaining pressure on the Greek Cypriots; with the failure of the talks, a key source of leverage against the Greek Cypriots had been frittered away by the GOT -- "that's the reality of the situation"; (2) that even while elements of the MFA are insisting on incorporating the Annan Plan, TGS officials have, in essence, pressed us to recognize a sovereign and independent "TRNC" (ref B), which does not square with Eguz' points (Eguz replied defensively that "I never said we didn't have problems with the Annan Plan"); 3) it is important, therefore, that Annan Plan be the basis of continued negotiations -- and that the GOT accept this as gospel even after Cyprus on April 16 signs the EU Accession Protocols, which the Turks regard as problematic in that it fails to refer to UN-related equities.

PEARSON